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41. Introduction and motivation
Turkey trade openness has been on the rise in the last decades, especially after import-substitution 
policies were abandoned in favour of trade integration measures since the 1980’s. The sum of export 
and import as a share of GDP moved from 18% in 1980 to 48% in 2001, when a severe financial crisis 
led to a contraction of 7.5% in GDP after a period of sustained growth. 1
The European Union (EU) is by far Turkey’s main trading partner, accounting for slightly more than 
half of its exports and slightly less that half of its imports. Since 1963, Turkey has been given a 
preferential trade status by the EU, with the Ankara Association agreements leading to a progressive 
reduction in import tariffs (especially on the EU side), the adoption of pieces of the EU regulatory 
body (the so-called acquis communautaire) by Turkey, and the provision for a gradual creation of a 
customs union. In 1970, an addition protocol to the Ankara agreement was signed, that fixed the 
transitional period before the establishment of the customs union in 22 years. Finally, and after several 
delays, the customs union was launched at a end of 1995 and became operational in 1996. In the 
meantime, Turkey had also submitted its application for EU membership in 1987, which was initially 
rejected but has thereafter been reconsidered leading to the official start of negotiations in October 
2005.
There are two main perspectives on the current state of merchandise trade relations between Turkey 
and the EU. Although recognising that many steps towards preferential integration have been made, 
some authors place the emphasis on the trade potential that could emerge from full EU accession 
                                                
 Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Joint Workshop of the LUISS Lab on European Economics
and the Centre for European Policy Studies (Rome, September 29, 2004), and at the Italian National Research Council 
Trade Conference held at Bocconi University (Milan, November 5, 2004). We acknowledge insightful comments from 
Sergio de Nardis, Daniel Gros, Rodolfo Helg, Fabio Sdogati and two anonymous referees. Usual disclaimers apply.
1  Less severe GDP contractions were however registered in 1994 and 1999, while high growth rates prevailed in the rest of 
the 1990’s. On the economic developments and growth strategies adopted in Turkey in the last decades, see among others 
Togan (2002), Utkulu and Ozdemir (2003), and Dervis et al. (2004).
5because of three main reasons. Administrative barriers will be progressively reduced to levels consistent 
with the Internal Market. Moreover, technical barriers to trade are likely to decrease considerably 
through harmonization or mutual recognition of standards and regulations. Finally, uncertainty related 
to political risk and macroeconomic instability should decrease, thus fostering a more favourable 
environment for trade and (foreign) investment. This argument also rests on econometric research 
based on different versions of the “gravity model” approach: according to the estimates, bilateral trade 
between Turkey and the EU could rise from about 34% (Lejour et al., 2004) to 46% (Flam, 2003) after 
accession.2
Other scholars underline that a high degree of trade integration has already been achieved thanks to  
the Association agreements and eventually to the EU-Turkish customs union. As mentioned before, 
the EU has progressively opened its markets to Turkey long before the actual negotiation of the 
customs union, gradually reducing tariffs on a large number of industrial products. Turkey has also 
adopted a significant portion of EU regulations, and even the Common External Tariff imposed by the 
EU on third trade partners. The customs union was indeed the outcome of long-standing and 
progressively more intense merchandise trade relations between the two parties. Quoting Ülgen and 
Zahariadis (2004), “with respect to trade in goods, Turkey is almost part to the Single Market”, hence 
the relevant question is not “by how much will merchandise trade rise?”, but “when and how will trade 
be liberalized also in agriculture and services?”.
In this paper, we try to assess empirically whether trade relations between Turkey and the EU, which is 
its most developed economic neighbour and its politico-economic “attractor”, are already so “special”. 
In order to do this, we analyse Turkey’s merchandise trade over a long time span (1967-2001) with the 
so-called gravity model in a panel-data framework. Provided that the gravity benchmark fits, we want to 
assess whether Turkey already has a special trade relation with the EU, namely whether actual trade 
volumes have been significantly larger that predicted ones.
                                                
2 These figures are not limited to trade in merchandise, but also include services. The working of the gravity model and its 
previous use in the current context are reviewed in Section 2.
6The paper is organised as follows. A brief review of studies providing theoretical background and 
empirical applications for the gravity equation is presented in Section 2. Section 3 illustrates our 
modelling strategy for a panel-data environment. Section 4 shows and discusses the main estimation 
results. Section 5 concludes.
2. A brief survey of the gravity approach to trade
The gravity model is a rather successful econometric approach that has been adopted to analyse spatial 
interactions among different kinds of variables. The general idea behind it comes from the gravity 
theory in physics, from which it also derives its name. In his seminal work, Tinbergen (1962) applied 
such concepts to international trade, explicitly including the geographical dimension in his analysis and 
treating countries as entities having a physical location. The gravity model has thereafter proved quite 
successful in a variety of contexts, and has been extensively employed for empirical purposes in several 
fields of the social sciences (see Sen and Smith, 1995, for a survey).
In the context of the gravity approach to international trade, the “physical entities” are the exporting 
and importing countries, and their “masses” are the sizes of their economies. The larger the economies 
of the involved countries, the larger the trade exchanges among them. However, distance exerts a 
resistance effect on trade flows, mainly because of transport costs and time to deliver. Additional trade 
hampering factors are import tariffs, border controls and quantitative restrictions, representing indirect 
or artificial trade costs. Helpman and Krugman (1985) draw on a differentiated product framework 
with increasing returns to justify the gravity model. Bergstrand (1989) and Deardorff (1998) argue that 
the gravity approach is coherent both with “new trade theories” stressing the role of market 
imperfections and product differentiation, and with traditional setups focusing on factor endowments 
and technology gaps that can dynamically evolve. Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) derive an 
operational gravity equation based on an estimated CES expenditure system, in order to account for the 
so-called border puzzle.
7There are three main kinds of applications of the gravity model to the EU, which is of course a very 
interesting subject on institutional and policy grounds. First, there are studies that estimate the gravity 
equation with bilateral trade flows across a large number of countries, and include a dummy variable in 
the regression taking value one, if both trade partners are EU countries, or zero if at least one of them 
is not (for a survey, see for instance Di Mauro, 2000). The idea is to capture an additional effect on 
trade volumes due to participation to the Internal Market, i.e. the “special” relationship between EU 
countries. This is indeed the more frequent finding of these econometric studies.
A new strand of research looks at the trade impact of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the 
introduction of the euro, based on the so-called “Rose-effect” of currency union on trade (see Rose, 
2000). The idea is that membership of the EMU, beyond that of the EU, fosters trade by eliminating 
exchange rate volatility. What is relevant here is that the coefficient of EMU dummy (value one if both 
trade partners are in the EMU, zero otherwise) is large and significant (see Micco et al., 2003).
The gravity approach has also been used to assess the trade potential of EU enlargement, both for the 
ten New Member states of 2004, and for the current applicants. Here the idea is to first check whether 
these countries showed trade volumes with the EU above the gravity model benchmark (as it is the case 
of full EU members) already before accession. Second, if they did not, the gravity model can be used to 
compute the additional trade potential to be expected after accession by projecting the value of the EU 
dummy coefficient on actual trade flows. A relevant increase in trade exchanges between the EU and 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) was generally predicted as a consequence of the 
Eastern enlargement, though different studies pointed out to figures ranging from 30% to over 50% 
(for a review essay, see Brenton and Manzocchi , 2002).
The likely impact on trade of Turkey’s membership of the EU has been analysed in gravity model 
setups by Lejour et al. (2004) and Flam (2003). Lejour et al. (2004) first estimate a gravity model of 
sectoral trade flows for a large set of countries, including both merchandise and services exchanges. 
They find that a EU dummy must be included in most of the sectoral regressions to take into account 
the special intensity of trade relations between EU members. Subsequently, they use the statistically 
8significant estimated coefficients of the dummy to evaluate the potential increase in EU-Turkey 
bilateral trade. Even though the empirical results differ considerably across sectors, they estimate that 
the sectoral weighted average of EU-Turkey bilateral trade could increase by 34% if Turkey were a 
member of the EU. Adopting a different framework, Flam (2003) points out to an even larger impact 
of Turkey’s accession on its aggregate trade volume with the EU (plus 46%).
As mentioned in the Introduction, other scholars tend instead to believe that Turkey is almost part to 
the Single Market for what trade exchanges in goods are concerned (Ülgen and Zahariadis, 2004). If 
this were true, one should already find that the volume of (merchandise) trade between Turkey and the 
EU exceeds the predictions of the standard gravity model. In order to check for this, in the next 
Section we analyse Turkey’s merchandise trade over a long time span (1967-2001).
3. Modelling strategy
Our empirical analysis exploits a balanced panel of annual observations and covers a total of 45 
countries, chosen on the basis of their trading importance with respect to Turkey, over a 35-year period 
(1967-2001). Therefore, the dataset consists of 1575 entries for each variable of the panel. Sources and 
definitions are presented in Appendix.
The dependent variables in the empirical estimations, itT , are Turkey’s merchandise exports to, or 
alternatively imports from, country i over Turkey’s GDP. This normalisation of trade flows in terms of 
GDP shares allows us to proxy the real behaviour of imports and exports. Provided that trade statistics 
do not distinguish among exports (imports) deflators according to different trade partners, the use of 
common price deflators would be rather arbitrary (Frankel and Romer, 1999).
The explanatory variables used in different specifications are the following (i stands for any Turkey’s 
trading partner; see the Appendix for their formal definitions):
- itSUMGDP measures the size of the economies of both the exporting and the importing country, and 
it is expected to have a positive effect;
9- itSIMSIZE  represents a measure of size similarity taking values in the range - (perfect dissimilarity) 
and -0.69 (perfect similarity), and it may have either a positive or a negative effect. Countries similar in 
size should trade more if their exchanges are of  intra-industry nature (Helpman and Krugman, 1985); if 
their exchanges are of inter-industry nature, the coefficient should be negative;
- itRELENDOW  measures relative factor endowments. The proxy employed is the difference in per-
capita GDP, and it is aimed at capturing a possible Linder effect (see, for instance, Arnon et al., 1996). 
As pointed out by Helpman (1987) this is an accurate proxy when there are only two factors of 
production, capital and labor, and all goods are freely traded. Other measures, such us GDP or capital 
per employee, might prove better, but the long time dimension of our panel (1967-2001) implies some 
data constraints. The impact of factor endowments might go in either direction: a negative coefficient 
would point towards an intra-industry trade structure; a positive coefficient would suggest that an inter-
industry trade structure prevails;
- itEU  is a dummy for trade partners belonging to the European Union;
- itEUTREND  is an alternative dummy aimed at capturing the relationship with the EU as it evolves 
over time. This variable is constructed interacting itEU  with a time trend;
- itCUST  is a customs union dummy constructed interacting itEU  with a dummy taking value 1 for t
= 1996, …, 2001 and 0 otherwise;
- itAGR  is a trade-agreement dummy that takes value 1 when a preferential agreement (different from 
the Association agreement with the EU) between Turkey and partner i exists , and 0 otherwise;
- iDIST  refers to the logarithm of distance between capitals (or economic centers) of Turkey and 
country i. Since the longer the distance the higher transport and insurance costs, its coefficient is 
expected to be negative;
- iBORD  is a contiguity dummy taking value 1 when Turkey and partner i share either a land or a sea 
border, 0 otherwise;
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- Di are country dummy variables aimed at capturing specific features of trade patterns with certain 
regional aggregates (see Appendix); and it  is a normally distributed error term with zero mean and 
constant variance for all observations.
Other variables might prove important as well. For instance, the wide fluctuations of the Turkish Lira 
exchange rate can have discouraged international transactions with Turkey.3 Unfortunately, data 
availability on bilateral exchange-rate volatility vis-a-vis the Lira is rather limited for our sample of 
countries over 1967-2001.
Standard gravity models often use cross-section data to estimate trade patterns in a a given year, or on 
averaged data. However, panel-data might provide additional insights, capturing the relevant 
relationships over time and avoiding the risk of choosing an unrepresentative year. Moreover, panels 
allow to monitor unobservable individual effects   i  between trading partners: such feature is relevant 
because a proper econometric specification of the gravity equation should control for heterogeneous 
trading relationships. For this reason, we run panel regressions. The random-effects model (REM) 
would be more appropriate when estimating trade flows between a randomly drawn sample of trading 
partners from a larger population. On the other hand, the fixed-effects model (FEM) would be a better 
choice than the REM when one is interested in estimating trade flows between a predetermined 
selection of countries (Egger, 2000). Since our sample only includes trade exchanges between Turkey 
and its main trading partners, the FEM might be the most appropriate specification. However, we have 
checked between these two alternative specifications using the Hausman test, and the choice of the 
FEM is supported by the data.4
The problem with the FEM is that direct estimation of the coefficients of those variables that do not 
change over time, such as distance and border, and to some extent also the dummy variables, is difficult 
because the inherent transformation of the FEM tends to wipe out such variables. In order to cope 
                                                
3 Part of the risk of exchange rate fluctuations can be “insured” through forward currency contracts, even though they are 
usually unavailable for periods longer than one year.
4 See Tables 1 and 4 below.
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with this, a possibility would be to perform panel estimates leaving the fixed effects out and replacing 
them with distance, border and regional dummy variables. Even though such approach explicitly takes 
into account some sources of cross-sectional variation, from a statistical point of view it may produce 
biased coefficients if the omitted individual effects are correlated with the regressors. Moreover, the 
fixed effects might partly solve the endogeneity bias that arises if countries tend to establish customs 
unions with partners with which they already trade more. An alternative strategy is the two-step 
procedure suggested, for example, by Cheng and Wall (2003): after the standard FEM regression, the 
second step consists of running a cross-section regression with the country-specific individual effect as 
the dependent variable and distance, border and dummies as explanatory variables. This approach may 
be a valid compromise with respect to the issue of including or not the individual effects. However, the 
reliability of the coefficients may prove questionable if the estimated equations are misspecified because 
of an omitted variable bias, due e.g. to the difficulty of clearly identifying the determinants of cross-
country variability. 
In what follows, we show regressions based both on a standard FEM (without distance and border, but 
with dummies for trade agreements and for EU trade partners); and on the two-step routine outlined 
above. We start from the estimation of import and export gravity equations with fixed effects, through 
the Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) procedure. In this framework, the intercept terms  i
represent country-specific individual effects, while the slope coefficients are assumed to be the same for 
the whole sample of countries. Even though the gravity model has been originally formulated in 
multiplicative form, a specification in log-linear terms allows to interpret the coefficients as elasticities:
1 2 3 4 5ln it it it it it it iti SUMGDP SIMSIZE RELENDOW AGR EUT             (1)
First-order residual autocorrelation, if detected by the Durbin-Watson test, is accounted for by an 
AR(1) specification for the error term.5
                                                
5 The AR(1) specification prevents us from testing a trend variable in the FEM, as this would lead to multicollinearity.
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In the second set of regressions, we follow the above-mentioned two-step procedure. In the first step, 
we re-estimate equation (1) excluding itAGR  and itEU ; in step two, we run a cross-section regression 
of the country-specific effects on distance, border and regional dummies:
0 1 2
1
n
iki i ii k
k
DIST BORD D

          (2)
4. Empirical results
The baseline gravity equation (1) fits well both Turkish import and export data over 1967-2001, as 
suggested by Table 1:
[TABLE 1]
As far as GDP size and similarity are concerned, the coefficients are statistically significant both for 
exports and imports. In particular, itSUMGDP is found to have a positive coefficient, implying that 
Turkey tends to trade more with large economies. Trade flows are positively affected by itSIMSIZE , 
suggesting an intra-industry structure for Turkey’s exchanges. This result is also partly supported by the 
negative relationship between export volumes and the difference in relative endowments: the 
coefficient of itRELENDOW suggests that similarity in factor composition fosters Turkey’s exports. 
However, relative factor endowments are not statistically significant in the import equation.
Even though the estimates are qualitatively similar for both the export and the import equation, it is 
worthwhile to take into account the quantitative differences. While both Turkey’s imports and exports 
increase slightly more than 1.7% as itSUMGDP  increases by 1%, size similarity has a less (more) than 
proportional impact on exports (imports).
As far as other variables are concerned, regional agreements ( itAGR ) other than Turkey’s customs 
union with the EU do not seem to foster additional trade. Besides, neither Turkey’s exports to, nor
imports from, the EU display any “special” features with respect to the gravity model benchmark, since 
13
the EU dummy is not significant. As a check of robustness of the latter finding, Table 1 also shows the 
results of two slightly different specifications: in the first one, the EU dummy is interacted with a time 
trend to take into account the evolving nature of EU-Turkey trade relations; in the second one, the EU 
dummy is replaced by itCUST . The key result turns out to be robust, as none of the variables meant at 
capturing the additional trade with EU partners is significant.
Equation (1) does not consider an important modelling aspect of trade, namely dynamics (see de 
Nardis and Vicarelli, 2003). Distribution and service networks in the partner country, as well as entry 
and exit barriers due to sunk costs, may generate a substantially persistence of exchanges. Hence, the 
last column for both export and import equations in Table 1 show the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimates for a dynamic specification including the one-period lagged dependent 
variable on the right-hand side of equation (1) (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable suggests that past trade does indeed affect current trade; however, other parameters 
are broadly in line with the previous results. Even in this case, there is no evidence of special EU-
Turkey trade relations. 6
Table 2 shows the results of the cross-section regression (equation 2) obtained from the two-step 
procedure described above. While distance exerts the expected negative impact on trade flows, the 
border effect turns out to be insignificant.7 The magnitude of coefficients in the two equations, 
however, differs considerably: a 1% increase in distance makes exports decrease in the same 
proportion, while the decline in imports is about half percentage point.
[TABLE 2]
The behaviour of regional dummies is of particular interest here. On the one hand, the country 
dummies related to CIS and Mediterranean countries are positive and significant, suggesting that 
Turkey's trade with these regions tends to be larger than the predicted values of the gravity model. 
                                                
6 Additional lags are not statistically significant.
7 Overall, the statistical performance of this equation is worse, as the adjusted R-squared suggests.
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Cultural and historical linkages are likely to play a relevant role in this case. On the other hand, the EU 
(not too surprisingly, given the first set of estimates) and CEECs dummies are not statistically 
significant. This amounts to say that Turkey’s exchanges with the above-mentioned areas can be 
explained by the standard gravity variables alone.
These results might be influenced by the relatively long time horizon of the panel, compared with the 
substantial changes in Turkey's trade regime from 1967 to 2001. Turkey started to move towards an 
open market economy in the early 1980’s, undertaking a significant process of trade and price 
liberalization as well as privatization of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, EU-Turkey trade could 
have been fostered by the start of the customs union in 1996. We have therefore re-run the two-step 
regressions over three subsamples: the period 1967-1979, characterised by relatively autarchic policies;  
the period 1980-1995, with increasing trade openness and structural reforms; and the period 1996-2001, 
after the establishment of the customs union. The results of step two of the statistical routine are in 
Table 3. Although the parameters are less precisely estimated, due to the reduced dimension of the 
sample, the EU dummy is never significant in the import regressions, while it is marginally significant 
only in the export regression of period 1967-79, i.e. before Turkey liberalised its trade and the customs 
union was launched. As for other regions, the CIS dummy is still significant in most of the regressions, 
while the Mediterranean one is significant in most of the import regressions (but not in the export 
ones).
[TABLE 3]
Another check of robustness has been performed applying the same econometric models and 
techniques to Turkish trade exchanges net of food and agricultural trade, i.e. focusing only on 
manufacturing imports and exports (Tables 4 and 5). The reason for running a further round of 
estimates is that trade liberalisation of Turkey exchanges has above all involved industrial goods, while 
agriculture has remained relatively more protected. Furthermore, some authors argue that Turkey’s 
integration within the EU Internal Market could lead to more liberalisation and a rise in bilateral trade 
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in food and agricultural goods (see Ülgen and Zahariadis, 2004; Lejour et al., 2004), though others 
underline that the EU has already given preferential access to Turkeyss product in these sectors (Togan, 
2002) and do not expect large effects from Internal Market accession (see Flam, 2003). Our regressions 
show strong similarities between the two sets of estimates, with or without food and agricultural trade.
[TABLES 4 and 5]
Basically, the same variables explain trade with or without food and agriculture.8 As far as regional 
dummies are concerned, the estimates provide further evidence that Turkey’s special trade linkages 
(beyond the standard predictions of the gravity model) have so far emerged only with CIS and 
Mediterranean countries, not with the EU.
5. Concluding remarks
The question we address in this paper is “To what extent are Turkey's trade relations with the EU 
already special, after four decades of preferential treatment but ahead of EU membership?”. The gravity 
model provides a natural benchmark against which one can evaluate this issue: as the gravity model fits 
Turkey’s merchandise trade rather well over a long time span (1967-2001), we can ask whether Turkey-
EU actual trade volumes have been significantly larger that the predicted ones.
We cannot find robust evidence of additional trade between Turkey and the EU in none of our 
specifications, neither in a standard fixed-effect panel context nor in a two-step model that regresses 
country-effects on distance, border and regional dummies. When we break our time sample into three 
sub-periods, we only find weak evidence of some special trade effect between Turkey and the EU in 
the 1970’s, when Turkey was a relatively closed economy and the customs union was far to come. This 
is rather interesting, as on the contrary we find that Turkish trade exchanges with CIS and (partly) with 
                                                
8 The only departure from Table 1, is that the coefficient related to differences in factor endowments in Table 4 is 
significant and suggests an inter-industry structure of Turkish imports net of food and agriculture.
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Mediterranean countries “overshoot” the predictions of the gravity model. Therefore, we conclude that 
- despite the long history of preferential relations - trade between Turkey and the EU is simply what 
geography and economic size would predict nothing less but nothing more. 
Some conjectures on why this occurs can be formulated. First, if Turkey’s trade is historically and 
culturally more oriented towards Mediterranean and CIS countries, then it could be that EU 
preferential treatment and the customs union are not enough to revert this pattern and make trade 
volumes with the EU rise beyond the gravity benchmark. Only Turkey’s full membership of the EU 
could lead to a “special” trade relation in the way we have defined it, but preferential integration could 
be at the expense of the “outsiders”, in this case Mediterranean and CIS countries which could suffer 
from trade diversion and delocalisation (Manzocchi and Ottaviano, 2001).
Second, it can be that the customs union is too recent to fully yield its effects, and that the data will 
show a different picture in a while. This might be true, although some authors underline that there has 
been a long preparation to the customs union and that barriers have been gradually lifted over several 
years.
Finally, it can be that Turkey plays the role of a “trade platform” in the context of the wider Europe, 
connecting Mediterranean and CIS countries, on the one hand, and the enlarged European Union, on 
the other hand. If this is the case, even if full membership could enhance trade volumes with the EU, it 
need not do so at the expense of Turkey’s historical partners.
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Appendix: data sources and definitions of the variables
The dataset has been constructed from non-deseasonalized yearly entries from the CEPII Harmonised 
Accounts on Trade and the World Economy (CHELEM) database. Turkey’s trade partners have been 
chosen to have a significant geographical diversification and account for nearly 80% of Turkey’s total 
exports and 85% of Turkey’s total imports. They are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium and 
Luxemburg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, former Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, South 
Africa, South Korea, former Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tunisia, United 
Kingdom, United States, former Yugoslavia.
The main explanatory variables are defined as follows:
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where j is Turkey and i stands for any Turkey’s trading partner.
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The dummy variables are constructed as follows: EU includes Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
United Kingdom; MED includes Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia; CEECS includes Bulgaria, former 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania; CIS includes the former Soviet Union.
Distance between Ankara and Turkey’s trading partners capitals or main economic centers is expressed 
in kilometers and computed “as the crow flies”. The source is the website 
http://www.indo.com/distance.
Elaborations have been performed employing EViews 5.0 econometric package.
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TABLES
Table 1 – Panel-data regression results for merchandise trade flows
Imports Exports
T(-1)
0.571
(0.031)
0.495
(0.045)
SUMGDP
1.716
(0.240)
1.754
(0.248)
1.648
(0.257)
1.230
(0.441)
1.733
(0.269)
1.723
(0.251)
1.701
(0.292)
1.156
(0.532)
SIMSIZE
1.168
(0.310)
1.211
(0.299)
1.140
(0.308)
1.120
(0.292)
0.691
(0.343)
0.690
(0.361)
0.677
(0.360)
0.602
(0.324)
RELENDOW
-0.301
(0.248)
-0.316
(0.216)
-0.293
(0.248)
-0.218
(0.344)
-1.163
(0.321)
-1.164
(0.310)
-1.160
(0.317)
-1.169
(0.484)
AGR
-0.060
(0.047)
-0.080
(0.055)
-0.062
(0.040)
-0.048
(0.039)
0.078
(0.102)
0.087
(0.114)
0.084
(0.084)
0.012
(0.097)
EU
0.002
(0.110)
0.000
(0.210)
-0.021
(0.164)
-0.011
(0.124)
EUTREND
-0.002
(0.004)
0.000
(0.005)
CUST
0.063
(0.045)
0.024
(0.104)
AR(1) 0.754
(0.033)
0.754
(0.033)
0.755
(0.033)
0.740
(0.037)
0.741
(0.037)
0.740
0(.036)
2R
DW
HAUSMAN
0.94
2.02
36.33
0.94
2.02
36.33
0.94
2.02
36.33
…
…
…
0.95
2.25
14.42
0.95
2.25
14.42
0.95
2.25
14.42
…
…
…
Note. Standard errors in parentheses computed using heteroschedasticity-consistent matrix estimators. Coefficients in bold 
are not significant at standard levels. Parameters referred to fixed effects are not reported. The adjusted R-squared is 
unknown for GMM estimates.
Table 2 – Cross-section regression (Step 2) results for merchandise trade flows
Imports Exports
Intercept -20.339
(2.583)
-17.042
(3.586)
DIST -0.568
(0.309)
-1.026
(0.412)
BORD 0.211
(0.218)
0.741
(0.808)
EU 0.0889
(0.384)
-0.407
(0.591)
CEECS 0.592
(0.747)
0.552
(0.965)
MED 0.965
(0.398)
1.849
(0.832)
CIS 2.659
(0.384)
1.649
(0.638)
2R
DW
0.33
1.96
0.39
1.76
Note. Standard errors in parentheses computed using heteroschedasticity-consistent matrix estimators. Coefficients in bold 
are not significant at standard levels. 
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Table 3 – Cross-section (Step 2) results for merchandise trade flows over three sub-periods
Imports Exports
1967-79 1980-95 1996-01 1967-79 1980-95 1996-01
Intercept -15.8
(2.24)
-13.12
(2.38)
-29.16
(2.99)
-18.2
(3.62)
-11.1
(3.6)
-4.06
(5.48)
DIST -0.14
(0.26)
-0.14
(0.27)
-0.15
(0.36)
-0.29
(0.43)
-1.1
(0.4)
-0.96
(0.6)
EU 0.33
(0.44)
0.44
(0.5)
-0.05
(0.46)
-1.28
(0.63)
-0.35
(0.62)
-1.14
(0.99)
CEECS 0.70
(0.58)
0.64
(0.61)
1.27
(1.1)
0.88
(0.8)
-0.07
(0.98)
0.44
(1.46)
MED 0.91
(0.51)
0.72
(0.51)
1.94
(0.94)
-0.93
(1.82)
1.06
(0.77)
1.35
(1.2)
CIS 2.42
(0.38)
2.13
(0.45)
3.46
(0.45)
2.7
(0.59)
1.23
(0.67)
0.44
(1.1)
2R
DW
0.06
1.64
0.03
1.64
0.12
1.97
0.08
1.61
0.19
1.23
0.15
1.75
Note. Standard errors in parentheses computed using heteroschedasticity-consistent matrix estimators. Coefficients in bold 
are not significant at standard levels.
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Table 4 – Panel-data results for merchandise trade flows net of food and agriculture
Imports Exports
T(-1)
0.667
(0.040)
0.321
(0.012)
SUMGDP
1.392
(0.139)
1.400
(0.186)
1.328
(0.188)
1.003
(0.258)
2.978
(0.176)
2.965
(0.169)
2.960
(0.165)
2.555
(0.443)
SIMSIZE
1.278
(0.314)
1.368
(0.304)
1.314
(0.312)
1.315
(0.300)
1.215
(0.364)
1.202
(0.360)
1.189
(0.354)
1.219
(0.370)
RELENDOW
0.469
(0.208)
0.443
(0.211)
0.392
(0.244)
0.534
(0.292)
-1.312
(0.253)
-1.298
(0.299)
-1.287
(0.265)
-1.117
(0.306)
AGR
0.083
(0.100)
0.077
(0.065)
0.076
(0.071)
0.021
(0.118)
0.075
(0.113)
0.074
(0.100)
0.073
(0.101)
0.028
(0.099)
EU
-0.000
(0.002)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.019
(0.149)
-0.013
(0.151)
EUTREND
-0.010
(0.014)
-0.003
(0.011)
CUST
0.028
(0.035)
0.022
(0.106)
AR(1) 0.755
(0.016)
0.754
(0.012)
0.755
(0.017)
0.779
(0.014)
0.780
(0.014)
0.779
0(.014)
2R
DW
HAUSMAN
0.91
2.10
38.84
0.91
2.10
38.84
0.91
2.10
38.84
…
…
…
0.92
2.02
12.87
0.92
2.02
12.87
0.92
2.02
12.87
…
…
…
Note. See Table 1.
Table 5 – Cross-section (Step 2) results for merchandise trade flows net of food and agriculture
Imports Exports
Intercept -12.838
(5.397)
-28.789
(7.076)
DIST -1.385
(0.670)
-2.145
(0.856)
BORD 0.299
(0.314)
0.873
(0.964)
EU 0.430
(0.466)
-1.490
(1.124)
CEECS 0.008
(1.454)
0.393
(2.016)
MED 1.456
(0.615)
4.407
(1.263)
CIS 4.527
(0.546)
2.764
(1.039)
2R
DW
0.35
2.33
0.34
1.85
Note. See Table 2.
